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Abstract: The Council of Europe’s 2008 White Paper On Intercultural Dialogue signalled—
with a measure of deep concern—the limits of multiculturalism and its attendant problems of 
identity politics, communal segregation, and the undermining of rights and freedoms in 
culturally-closed communities. The White Paper proposed the replacement of the policy of 
multiculturalism with a policy of intercultural dialogue. The article in response reflects on the 
paradoxical nature of all discursive models of dialogue, including that of the Council of 
Europe, and suggests in its place a dramaturgical model of dialogue. All forms of dialogue 
that rely on discursive interaction run into the problem of incommensurable values, principles 
and ultimate authorities. From Weber and Kelsen to Castoriadis and Lyotard, this problem 
has been well assayed. It is not surmountable by the length, relative intensity, or presumptive 
civility of a dialogue. Neither ‘willingness to listen’ nor ‘open-mindedness’—let alone 
‘debate’ and ‘argument’—can solve the deep, difficult aporias of fundamental value conflicts. 
Nor can appeals to human rights, democracy and the rule of law, though the Council of 
Europe believes otherwise. We live in a world where liberal values of these kinds are 
routinely contested by militant pre-enlightenment communities. Dialogue can make no 
substantive difference to this. What then can? Historically and structurally, patrimonial 
cultures are only transformed under dramaturgical conditions. The article explores how the 
modern society of strangers mobilizes role-playing, public acting, dramatic dialogism, and 
various types of social dramaturgy (afforded especially by the anonymous theatre of its cities, 
markets and publics), and causes thereby the ironic incorporation or else the gradual 
withering-away of patrimonies, patriarchies and other kinds of pre-enlightenment 





The nineteen-fifties and nineteen-sixties saw the beginning of the end of the European 
nation state. The European Community, later the European Union, began to eat away at 
national sovereignty. Immigration programs started to erode cultural sovereignty. The motive 
for immigration in some cases was the playing out of the final chapter of European empires. 
In other cases, immigration marked the beginning of Europe’s demographic decline. As local 
European fertility rates fell below replacement numbers, immigrants made up the difference.  
National sovereignty supposed cultural sovereignty. That at least had been the 
romantic belief that underlay nationalism at its height. A good nation was a pure nation, one 
free of cultural mixing. Assimilation of migrants to the national norm was the standard policy 
of nation states. As nationalism declined as a force, multiculturalism replaced assimilation 
policies. Cultural diversity overtook national homogeneity in official policy. The problem 
with this in Europe was that diversity in practice often clashed with Enlightenment norms of 
universal freedom and procedural law. Multiculturalism, which prevailed in official thinking 
between 1975 and 2000, permitted cultural separatism. Under these auspices, many migrant 
communities developed in Europe with strong attachments to patriarchal and patrimonial 
norms. The result, as the Council of Europe (2008, p. 16) conceded in unusually frank 
language, was the development of segregated and mutually exclusive communities hostile to 
individual autonomy and the unimpeded exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
Europe created an unintended double bind.
1
 Communities with strong traditional 
views were hot-housed in a world of natural rights. Those who could not manage the double 
bind were susceptible to ideologies of extremism or terrorism. For others caught between the 
external world of freedom and adventure and their internal world of loyalty and obedience, 
the result was stifling conformism. This, ironically, was the obverse of what European 
politicians, who had championed multiculturalism in the first place, had expected. They 
wanted openness and toleration. They got closure and cultures of loyalty and obedience 
instead. By 2000, the gap between intention and consequence had become gaping—so large, 
in fact, that the European Union began to back-track from previous policy commitments. It 
embraced a policy of inter-cultural dialogue in place of multiculturalism. Inter-culturalism 
represented an attempt to reconcile Enlightenment universalism and cultural diversity. The 
new policy began with an explicit commitment to shared fundamental values, universal 
norms, and a common heritage—in short a commitment to Enlightenment norms of human 
rights, democracy and the rule of law (Council of Europe, 2008, pp. 4 and 5). Like 
assimilation and multiculturalism before it, the new policy of inter-cultural dialogue was ripe 
with tensions. These tensions did not have so much to do with the idea of inter-culturalism. 
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After all, for centuries and millennia, cultures have been in contact with each. They have 
routinely traded, interacted and fused. The problem of Europe’s new policy was rather with 
the concept of dialogue.  
Dialogue is a warm and fuzzy concept that hides a multitude of problems. What the 
European Union supposed is that communities in conflict can use the medium of dialogue to 
achieve cooperation, respect and harmonious interaction. The difficulty with this is that 
dialogue is not well suited to such ends at all. In order to engage in a dialogue, the partners in 
the dialogue must first share a common set of presuppositions. The paradox of dialogue is 
that the end point of any dialogue must be assumed by the dialogue partners at the outset. As 
the teachers of rhetoric in antiquity already knew, to convince someone in argument, you 
must share certain common assumptions with the person you are trying to convince. 
European Union policy is forthright on this point. The presupposition of its inter-cultural 
policy is enlightenment norms. Anyone who is to engage in inter-cultural dialogue first has to 
suppose human rights, democracy and the rule of law. Or, as the Council of Europe puts it, 
the equality of rights of men and women is not negotiable. Likewise, young people are not to 
grow up in a state of perpetual tutelage. 
Now, there is nothing wrong with spelling out the presuppositions of a dialogue. But 
at the same time if the condition of the possibility of mutual understanding is mutual 
understanding, one should not expect too much of dialogue. A dialogue can work to convince 
a doubting party of some minor premise—assuming the other party already accepts the major 
premise of the argument. Once interlocutors accept Enlightenment norms as their major 
premise, it is possible for them then to expand agreement on the application of those norms. 
Thus, if all persons are born free, and voting is an act of freedom, then all persons should 
vote. But if the parties do not agree that all persons are born free, the dialogue will not work. 
Europe’s problem today is that a significant portion of its immigrant population does 
not agree that all persons are born free. It does not matter whether such a view is held tacitly 
or explicitly. All that matters is that this is the operative view of a sizeable number of 
European citizens. The policy thinking of Europe, however, assumes otherwise. Thus the 
European Union can assert that the democratic values underpinning Council of Europe 
policies are universal. But they are not—at least they are not universal in an empirical sense. 
Much of the world either does not accept or else does not practice the norms of democracy, 
let alone the major enlightenment premise underlying democracy, that all persons are born 
free. Many notional democracies are in reality neo patrimonies. Democracy may be a 
universally applicable norm but that does not make it a universally agreed or adhered-to 
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value. From Max Weber (1946) and Hans Kelsen (1973) through to Cornelius Castoriadis 
(1991) and Jean-Francois Lyotard (1989), European social theorists in the twentieth century 
repeatedly pointed out that there is no agreement on fundamental values. This does not imply 
a state of relativism, but rather one of competing absolute values. This means that while 
democracy may be a non-negotiable principle for some of the world’s population, patrimony 
is just as deeply held by large numbers of others. While a part of the world’s population 
cherishes equality of rights as a value, another part is deeply wedded to the patriarchal values 
of hierarchy, loyalty, and obedience. So while Enlightenment norms may be universal in their 
self-declared applicability, they are far from universal in their empirical distribution. Many of 
the immigrants who came to Europe during the second half of the twentieth century did not 
have any attachment to democracy or equality, but did have deep affiliations to patrimony 
and patriarchy. Theirs was a connection to a deeply-felt world of honour, family, and ritual 
obligation. The European Union might assert that ‘gender rights’ are non-negotiable, but 
there are large numbers of European citizens who believe, on the contrary, that patriarchy is 
non-negotiable. No dialogue can bridge such an ontological difference. The impasse between 
tradition and natural rights is the deepest kind of cultural division imaginable. There is no 
way to talk through it.    
The Council of Europe (2008, p. 17) acknowledges this in a round-about fashion, 
when it admits that dialogue with those who refuse to dialogue is impossible. Yet the really 
difficult issue is not the refusal of dialogue, but the very possibility of dialogue in the first 
instance. No person or community can dialogue with another unless the parties to the 
dialogue share basic values and norms. The Council (2008, p. 17) supposes that dialogue with 
those who are ready to take part in dialogue but do not share common values with those with 
whom they are to dialogue ‘may be the starting point of a longer process of interaction, at the 
end of which an agreement on the significance and practical implementation of the values of 
human rights and the rule of law may very well be reached.’ This is a bureaucratic delusion.  
Readiness to dialogue comes from common values. Without common values, there can be no 
agreement on the significance of those values, and thus no major premise for a dialogue. 
Getting parties to the point where they share common values cannot be a dialogical process 
as dialogue presupposes those shared values. So is there is some other process of interaction 
that might lead to that end point? 
What would inspire a person to give up patrimony and patriarchy? What would 
induce a person to internalize the countervailing values of democracy and equality? No 
person can be convinced by debate or any other discursive means to internalize a new set of 
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fundamental norms and values. The state can legally require a person to follow rules that flow 
from a set of basic norms, but such legal requirements have no necessary effect on the basic 
convictions, motivations or views that a person holds. All the policy documents in the world 
can assert that democracy and the rule of law are universal values but that does not make 
them universally internalised values. Words, including dialogue, are an ineffectual and often 
counter-productive medium for creating fundamental value-commitments. Historically 
speaking, there has only been one really successful medium for effecting the transition from 
patriarchy to equality, or from feudal patrimony to democratic norms. This is the city, and 
more specifically large cities filled with strangers that operate on the basis of anonymity.
2
 
This is the force that engineered the shift from patrimony to democracy in classical Greek 
antiquity. Cities assumed this function in each of the great moments of European 
civilization—from the Roman Republic and the Roman Empire to the Renaissance, 
Reformation and Enlightenment (Murphy, 2001a, 2001b). 
Cities filled with strangers act on people in a way that words cannot. The medium of 
the city is non-discursive. It is mute. It is mutely potent even when words are spoken. Cities 
shape behaviours and mentalities without relying on discursive rationalities. Such 
rationalities always rest on a root reason—for instance that all persons are born equal. If that 
root reason has no traction over attitude or behaviour, then rationality is rendered null and 
void. One cannot appeal to reason, in this case the reason of equality, if equality is not 
recognized by the other party as a fundamental premise of reasoning. The appeal to reason 
falls on deaf ears. In the world today, the value of traditional hierarchy remains more 
persuasive on the whole than the enlightenment value of the equality of rights. While there 
are countries where the enlightenment value that we are all created equal does trump the pre-
enlightenment values of rank order and deferential authority, there are many societies where 
the reverse is true. In those societies, personal authority, rank and deference are paramount. 
Europe’s dilemma is that a visible segment of its contemporary migrant population sides with 
tradition against enlightenment. 
When the rationality of hierarchy and the rationality of equality confront each other, 
any acts of discursive communication that occur are incommensurable. That is to say, they 
cannot be compared in a way that would convince one party adhering to one value to accept 
the contrary value. There is no common value that subsumes the antithetical values of 
personal hierarchy and personal equality. In this circumstance, neither party can be rationally 
convinced of the other’s view, even in principle. In such cases, we end up with a standoff, 
and the makings of a cultural war. This is not the end of the matter, though, as human beings 
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do not only communicate discursively. There are many tacit and mute forms of 
communication that shape behaviours and mentalities independently of the appeal to 
discursive rationalities. The city as a medium is the most deep going and complex of these.  
City life is the great historic dissolvent of patriarchies and patrimonies. As social 
forms, patriarchy and patrimony are intimately and inextricably interwoven with the world of 
the household. Inflexible duties, claustrophobic intimacy, rigid moralities and insular and 
clannish behaviours—all of these characterise the traditional institution of the household. The 
city in contrast is a much more complex entity. Abstract norms and impersonal values 
consequently are much more suited to it. Freedom and democracy flourish in the city. There 
is a mutual affinity between the two. Where cities tacitly, through their anonymous structures 
and forms, encourage the interaction of strangers, the power of deference and personal 
hierarchy is thereby diminished. It is from this perspective that we need to understand the 
importance of the commitment of the Council of Europe (2008, p. 33) to stop the segregation 
of immigrant communities on housing estates by trying to encourage the interaction of these 
estates—note the subtle feudal connotation of this term—with city life. Only when cities—in 
the strong sense of that word—function properly do neo-patrimonial behaviours and 
mentalities diminish. The signs of this diminishing are that ritual formality is replaced by 
democratic informality, status and honour by open competition, and compulsory sociality by 
existential privacy. When this happens, the civilization of strangers begins to tacitly and 
practically replace the closed cultures of patrimonial communities.  
Stranger cities are built around the anonymous media of publics and markets. These 
media have a powerful dissolving effect on traditional cultures. Millions participate—as 
strangers—in publics and markets. In doing so, they both create and are subject to impersonal 
patterns and forms. The personalised hierarchies of pre-enlightenment societies have little 
resonance with the world of strangers. Entry into the environment of the stranger requires that 
social actors relinquish pre-enlightenment norms of behaviour. More precisely in this process 
persons become social actors. In the first instance, they remove themselves from communal 
pressures and smothering intimacy by escaping into the time and space of privacy. 
Paradoxically, the realm of privacy, of intimate freedom, is an essential condition of the 
existence of the public sphere. The social actor puts on make up in private as a prelude to 
going into the public realm. Communal cultures police lip stick not just because it promises 
unregulated sex but because it is one of the many kinds of mask that actors put on when 
entering the world of the stranger. They put on a face. Whereas names—the name of the 
family, kin, king and God—dominate pre-enlightenment cultures, the face is crucial in 
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stranger societies (Heller, 2002, pp. 43-44). The actors who fill these dramaturgical societies 
face the consequences of what they do, face their accusers in courtroom dramas, and face 
each other in public. Among the marks of pre-enlightenment cultures are the veiled face and 
the prohibition on appearing in public. Even those who are not subject to prohibitions to stay 
within the household do not really appear in public, but rather engage in non-public rituals 
and bargaining linking household to household. To appear in public—to walk among 
strangers—the social actor wears a costume or make-up or appears in some kind of aesthetic 
guise or else with some kind of prop or exaggerated facial or vocal tic or bodily mannerism. 
Fashion and cosmetics are essential to the appearing of social actors in dramaturgical 
societies.
3
 In these societies, an actor appears in a role in costume on some kind of public 
stage, no matter how metaphorical the stage may be. Roles, even familiar ones, differ from 
rituals. Roles are plastic, and always partially invented, or rather more precisely each social 
actor plays even familiar roles differently, and for better or worse. Acting brings knowing, 
self-reflexive distance, and, at its peak, subtle irony and self-aware paradox to roles. These 
qualities are mostly absent from traditional cultures, and indeed to the eye of the 
traditionalist, the role-player in playing a part is simply a person who lacks all authenticity 
and mocks all belief. This is both true and untrue in ways that defy explanation across the 
divide that separates traditional and enlightenment cultures, but at the very least this 
perception of the social actor is quite understandable.    
Social beings regularly make the difficult and painful transition from the traditional 
community to the public world of the stranger. They manage this not as a result of dialogue 
or because anyone can demonstrate discursively that democracy is better than hierarchy, but 
rather because the dramaturgical society of dressing up and inhabiting characters is more 
interesting than the world of social ritual. It is not that social rituals are uninteresting; it is just 
that dramaturgical enactments are more interesting. They are more interesting because they 
involve a doubling of the self. The young woman who puts on lip stick is learning to be 
someone who she is not. There are risks involved in this, but it is also exciting. It draws on 
the human imagination. The imagination is the faculty that allows us to think of anything and 
anyone as something else, including our own selves. Sometimes we make fools of ourselves 
when we do this, but other times we do things and achieve things that otherwise would not 
have been possible. We extend ourselves. We extend ourselves when we enter the world of 
strangers. We do this by assuming roles and personae that are outside our normal ways of 
behaving. In order functionally to interact with strangers and enjoy the myriad emotional and 
material benefits of the stranger city, actors have to relinquish personalised and ritualised 
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ways of behaving expressive of rank-order and household hierarchy. In markets and publics, 
impersonal forms and patterns, many of a quasi-aesthetic kind, dominate.  
The point of intersection of traditional and enlightenment cultures is the civilization of 
the city. This civilization is anonymous. It tends to dissolve cultures that have a high degree 
of face-to-face social control represented by shame regulation and hierarchies of personal 
dependence. Yet cities that function as civilizations are also very paradoxical places. Part of 
what makes them paradoxical is that they not only transcend cultures of all kinds, they also 
nest them. They accommodate to a high degree antithetical forms of life and rationalities. 
They do so in part by indifference to them. Tolerance is a kind of indifference, and city life at 
its most potent is tolerant to the point of indifference.  The true power of cities comes from 
the paradoxical nature of civilization rather than from the potentially eristic cultures that 
coexist within them. While culture wars have been a periodic blight on cities, the most 
celebrated metropolises mobilise forms of enigmatic communication—such as those of irony, 
paradox and antinomy—that resist the monomania of rationalities of all kinds, including the 
enlightenment kind. Let us not forget how quickly the universal freedoms of the 
Enlightenment get translated by the legislation of the state into the implacable rationality of 
bureaucratic rules and policies. Great cities function differently. They are a union of 
opposites of commerce and art, ethnicity and anonymity, time and eternity, the godless and 
the godly. They are used to creating strange unions, even those of hierarchy and democracy. 
Humour, satire and wit allow city dwellers to live with incongruent forms of life. They wryly 
smile or raise an eyebrow at the passing parade of social types. Rationalities are turned into 
characters in an encompassing comic social drama.
4
 Cities cope with pre-enlightenment 
forms of life in their midst by subjecting them to the rule of metaphor. They gradually turn 
these cultures into something other than what they are. They draw the denizens of pre-
enlightenment cultures into publics and markets. Food is translated into restaurant service, 
clothes become fashion, and rituals become exercise routines, and so on. The metaphoric 
power of translation is very effective.  
Great cities treat cultures dramaturgically. One sees this in the history plays of 
Shakespeare. These provided a drama of feudal norms and modern values for the audience of 
the great city. Such playacting is dialogical in a way that no ‘rational dialogue of cultures’ 
could ever be. Notably, Shakespeare makes no value judgements about his characters. He has 
no ‘point of view’. He loves all his characters, traditional and modern, equally. This is, in 
part, because many of the actions of these characters are ambivalent, and often they have the 
contrary effect to what they intend. Also in part it is because the public sphere of 
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Shakespeare’s theatre subsumed and transcended both the feudal partisans and the state 
reformers who paraded brilliantly across his stage.
5
  Publics like markets are broader and 
more interesting, more absorptive, than either segregated cultures or the universal law of the 
state. The art of Aeschylus’ tragedy, Aristophanes’ comedy, Bach’s polyphony or Cervantes’ 
picaresque novel have the same effect as the city that produces them. They transcend both the 
culture of the household and the universal law of the state in the direction of the delightful 
powers of dramaturgy, metaphor and polyphony. 
Art and pedagogy share in these powers. But a note of scepticism is also in order. 
Artists and intellectuals are very tempted to proselytize either on behalf of the enlightenment 
state or pre-enlightenment cultures. They readily become enlisted in the cause of universal 
legal rights or militant particularistic hierarchies. In doing so, they set aside art’s essential 
powers of dramaturgy, metaphor and polyphony. They are easily seduced—whether it is by 
the romance of the alien other or the power of universal law. In either case, they lose their 
sense of humour and irony—and their distance from society. They become engaged, with a 
‘point of view’. They parrot all kinds of earnest strictures. They come out fighting, some of 
them on behalf of tradition’s claustrophobic moralities and others in aid of the enlightenment 
state’s mildly despotic regulations. What this results in is a palpable loss because neither 
enlightened state regulation nor multi-cultural romance can do what the anonymous power of 
the city can. This is to make it possible for some very unlikely forces to cohabitate. This does 
not happen without tension. Nonetheless the cohabitation of opposites is possible because the 
civilization of the city adapts well to antinomy. It does this principally through physical, 
material, and dramaturgical—in a word, through non-discursive—forms. These adapt well to 
the city’s oscillating motions and its perpetual need to blend innumerable forces. Great cities 
are what they are because they are able to effectively meld the universal and the particular, 
the recurrent and the accidental. In the city, the new and the old, the finished and the 
incomplete, the permanent and the temporary, the supernatural and the natural coexist in a 
conflicting, interwoven, dramaturgical and yet very practical harmony. The public theatre of 
the great city of strangers is able to mediate this in a way that neither law, nor reason nor 
language can. 
Often the media of reason—documents and declarations—are really covert assertions 
of the law. There is nothing wrong in asserting the law insofar as it is understood that this is 
what is being done. Thus in appealing for inter-cultural dialogue what the Council of Europe 
is in fact asserting is the universal law of the Enlightenment. ‘All persons are born equal.’ It 
is perfectly reasonable then, in light of the law of the Enlightenment, that the European Union 
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bans extreme practices of patriarchal cultures—such as infibulations or the obligation of 
women to ask their father’s permission to marry. Here, at the pointy end of cultural 
difference, there can be no room for dialogue. Modern Europe—long ago—decided these 
matters in favour of the Enlightenment. To do otherwise now would necessitate Europe to 
stop being Europe. It is nonetheless striking that the political struggle of feudal tradition and 
state-sponsored modernity—which Shakespeare at the end of the sixteenth century could in 
some measure treat in retrospect as the subject matter of his history plays—should re-emerge 
as a matter of keen political contention again at the beginning of the twenty-first century. 
This serves to underline the fact that while universal law and its bureaucratic regulations have 
a part to play, law can only meaningfully outlaw the fiercest aspects of patrimonial and 
patriarchal cultures. It cannot induce belief in the abstract norms of the Enlightenment on the 
part of the denizens of those cultures. Immanuel Kant long ago noted the difference between 
external and internal motivations for obeying the law.  
    Law thus cannot effect the transition from patrimonial culture to dramaturgical 
society. The mechanisms for doing this are instead woven into the fabric of cities, markets 
and publics. It is in these settings that the role-playing and theatrical-style dialogue of the 
society of strangers are learnt. In these milieus, identities are ironized. Cultural beings are 
transformed into social actors who play parts, invest in roles, create metaphors of themselves, 
and learn to negotiate the paradoxical ways of the city. These actors learn to move in and out 
of codes, cultures, ethnicities, histories and religions. They come to inhabit these skins as 
masks, always with a sense of double coding and a wink of the eye. They wink also at the 
state whose universal law they like in abstraction but whose regulation in practice they find 
petty, vacuous and absurd. They learn what the Irish did, painfully, in the course of the 
twentieth century. This was to transform themselves from a kind of Irishness that was typical 
of a morbidly patriarchal culture to an Irishness that was modern in a procedural way but also 
that was much more Joycean in nature than the gloomy world it replaced. In the course of 
this, the Irish learnt to talk the talk of the enlightenment, complete with its many rational 
presuppositions and innumerable bureaucratic consequences. But perhaps more importantly 
they acquired something of the charm of the actor in a play put on by the society of strangers 
who believe that the entire world is a stage. We can expect this dialectic—of tradition and 
natural right, law and comedy, charm and insipidness—to be repeated many times, in many 
different societies, in coming centuries just as it has already been repeated many times over 
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4
  Heller (2005) assays comedy’s sceptical view of rationality.  
5
  On the subsuming of multiple points of view and rationalities in Shakespeare’s history plays, see 
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